For those of you just joining us, Russell and I have been discussing the contention by Scott Adams (and assorted philosophers, over the years) that there is no such thing as free will. Russell replied to Adams’ argument here, and said, among other things:
To say that the choice of getting out of bed is a function of those algorithms is precisely the same thing as saying it is a function of free will. The will is the algorithm!
I think Adams is defining "free will" as the ability to choose a path inconsistent with the predestination of the universe. I don’t agree. I think that the thing we think of as free will is part of the predestination of the universe.
I suspect that part of why people argue so bitterly against Adams’ premise is that the definition Russell is proposing is somehow ultimately unsatisfying. After all, if Adams is right, every decision you’ve ever made, every thought you’ve ever had, every word in your every conversation, right down to the timing of the pauses between the words, was determined entirely by either the position and velocity of the matter in the universe billions of years before you were born, the random variations introduced by quantum mechanics, or both—and by nothing else. Every other factor that appears to contribute to your decisions actually falls within the scope of these two controlling factors.
Without taking a position on whether Adams is right, since I remain without an opinion one way or the other, how would labeling the decisions made under those constraints be different from, for example, saying that a dropped basketball exercises free will when it chooses to bounce? Certainly we, unlike a basketball, are conscious*, but under Adams’ model, what we consciously decide was as predetermined at the beginning of time as everything else in the universe. We contribute no more to the outcome of our decisions, or any part of our lives, then the ball contributes to where it comes to rest. How could calling that "free will" not render the term meaningless?
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*I propose we stipulate for the sake of argument that basketballs are not, in fact, conscious, and that we are.